Economics is a difficult science. Models are abstractions from the real world, yet they are supposed to inform those using them about what is going on. Making matters worse, there are many models of different varieties which come to differing conclusions. The practitioner is then confronted with the task to choose the right model that fits the specific research topic and provides the most "correct" while still simplified view of reality.
One marked example of this clash between theory and practice continues to be the monetary policy of China. The People's Bank of China (PBoC) fixed the exchange rate of the yuan to the US dollar in the middle of the 1990s. What represented a 50% depreciation in 1995, was upheld at 8.28 Yuan Renminbi (RMB) to the dollar for over ten years -in spite of currency turmoil and depreciation among China's neighbouring countries during the Asian crisis in 1997/98. After 2005 the RMB exchange rate was only allowed to appreciate on tiptoes at 5% a year to the dollar before the Great Financial Crisis broke out in 2008. Until today practitioners are wondering how long the fixed exchange rate regime will be sustainable. Textbook Mundell-Fleming theory tells us that in a fixed exchange rate regime with perfect or semi-perfect capital mobility the money supply is turned into an endogenous variable. The central bank is required to provide domestic money or foreign money depending on whether there is an excess demand for domestic currency from trade surpluses or capital inflows (FDI) or vice versa. The former puts upward pressure, the latter downward pressure on the domestic currency. This pressure can be alleviated by the central bank by either selling or buying foreign currency, thus expanding or contracting the money supply respectively. The managed exchange rate regime run by the PBoC has been in operation for more than a decade and a half now by virtue of which the Chinese have created the world's largest foreign reserves valued at US$3.800 billion (about €3.000 bn) by mid-2012. With the dollar peg still in place and a weakly negative correlation between the growth of foreign exchange reserves and the money supply, it seems a different theory is needed to explain the persistence of the Chinese monetary regime.
A contender to the standard theory view is the so-called ‚compensation thesis' as proposed by Lavoie and Wang (2012) . According to this view, a central bank is able to offset a rise in the money supply by different operations on its balance sheet other than inverted open market operations. Therefore, the acquisition of net foreign assets through an export-led growth strategy will not lead to an increase in the money supply and will consequently leave the price level unaltered. Changes in the price level depend rather on credit than on money, which develops independently from the central bank's compensation of net foreign asset growth within the banking system.
In the remainder of this article we will explain the two theories, examine their assumptions and evaluate them in the light of empirical data. We find that the textbook view is not supported by Chinese data. On the other hand, our examinations of the balance sheets substantiate the compensation thesis.
2.
The theory of exchange rate stabilization
The two theoretical frameworks, while dealing with the same issue, take very different angles. Whereas the Mundell-Fleming model imagines a simple central bank engaged in exchanging foreign money into domestic money, the compensation thesis assumes that the central bank has more options and is trying to insulate the growth of credit from disturbances arising from the net acquisition of foreign assets.
Also, the Mundell-Fleming model assumes an asset-based banking system whereas the compensation thesis is usually based on an overdraft banking system. In such a system, banks do not settle inter-bank payments by exchanging money or government bonds, but through their overdraft account with the central bank. Banks are indebted vis-à-vis the central bank at all times; the banking system in continental Europe is characterised by this system (Godley and Lavoie 2004, 4) . The endogenous creation of credit within the banking system is supposed to be the driver of changes in the price level, whereas in the Mundell-Fleming model this role is reserved for central bank money. This different view of the conduct of central bank policy is what makes the difference. In the following, the two models are introduced and examined with respect to assumptions, causality and the underlying mechanism that connects the balance of payments with the price level.
The Mundell-Fleming model
The Mundell-Fleming model (1962) 
The compensation thesis
The compensation thesis states that foreign capital flows are compensated by changes in the central bank's balance sheet so that the money supply is not affected.
The balance sheet of the PBoC below shows that a rise of foreign reserves (a) may be compensated through at least three different balance sheet operations (b, c, d): is that the banking system is assumed to be of the so-called overdraft variety. Banks are indebted toward the central bank because they are able to get loans directly from the central bank, providing them with liquidity for interbank payments settlements, depending on certain rules.
On the liabilities side, there are three additional entries. The government holds deposits at the central bank, which it can spend at will, constituting a liability for the central bank. The central bank is able to issue bills (and bonds) in order to mop up what it regards as excess money in the banking system. It can thereby influence liquidity and thus affect the amount of funding available in the banking system. In addition, the central bank has equity or own capital. Now, according to the compensation thesis, capital inflows from abroad will not necessarily increase the money supply. In the presence of a fixed exchange rate target, inflowing foreign exchange will increase reserve holdings (a) by central bank acquisition of, e.g., US dollars as above. However, there are now three different routes by which this increase can be compensated so that the money supply remains unaffected by the capital inflow. First, claims on domestic banks can be reduced. As A second option for the central bank is to increase the amount of deposits the government holds with the central bank. The last option is the emission of central bank bills, a concept known as sterilization. In these cases the money supply is initially increased, leaving banks with cash to invest which they prefer to store in safe interest-bearing assets rather than hold in cash. If banks use their reserves to buy safe central bank bills, the money supply is being reduced again. Alternatively, the banking sector could be coerced into taking newly created central bank bills onto its balance sheet (financial repression).
In consequence, all three options above result in the money supply not being changed by an increase of foreign reserves. This is clearly a different result to the In the next section, we will turn to some empirical evidence from China for the two competing views. First we scrutinize the assumptions of both models, then we look at the connection between foreign reserves and money supply and finally we turn to the conduct of monetary policy in the case of the compensation thesis and the use of quantitative instruments like reserve requirements and the loan-to-deposit ratio. Table 4 for exact figures). The most striking development is the one of net foreign assets (NFA 
Chinese monetary policy in practice

A collision of theory and practice
Five phases of pragmatic central banking
It may be conceivable, and there is considerable indication in the literature (Geiger 2006 , He and Pauwels 2008 , Reade and Volz 2011 , that the People's Bank of China has in the past had a rather flexible policy stance adjusting to circumstances at need.
We have therefore come up with an interpretation of the uses of monetary policy instruments and the targets of these changes which can be divided into the five phases shown in Figure 3 and summarised in Table 3 . Table 4 and Table 5 ). 
Practical problems of inflation control: loans vs. deposits
The Mundell-Fleming model is a not a good gauge of Chinese reality in the past decade nor is the money supply driven by inflows and outflows of foreign capital. The central bank rather insulates capital flows from the money supply by absorbing them on its balance sheet, to which end there are several monetary policy instruments available to policy makers. In the case of China, the standard tool of monetary policy is not the interest rate, as in most developed economies, but the ratio of required reserves (RRR). The use of this policy instrument is the subject of much academic debate. Fullwiler (2008, 2) declares that "reserve balances do not 'fund' loans or otherwise aid the creation of outside money". Outside money creation, used here somewhat irregularly for money created outside the central bank -which is normally called inside money by convention -, means that the money multiplier is not a causal determinant but may rather constitute an ex-post property of credit creation within the banking system. We agree with Fullwiler's statement up to a point. As we understand it, the RRR does play a substantial role in money creation in China.
Banks in China are bound by two institutional barriers from increasing their lending.
The first barrier is a legal ceiling of a 75% loans-to-deposit ratio ( The 75% loans-to-deposit ratio was scrapped as a legal barrier in July 2012 but continues to be monitored closely by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). The second is the reserve requirement ratio. We believe that the two are connected and that this connection is crucial in understanding how the PBoC can influence the amount of credit created within the banking system. An assumption required for this construct to work is sufficient demand for loans. Given a sufficiently high demand for loans in normal times, a rise in the RRR diminishes the share of deposits that banks can translate into loans. Since a constant amount of loans outstanding is now funded by a smaller share of free liquidity on the asset side of a banks' balance sheets, these would need to reduce their loan portfolio to meet the reserve and LDR requirements. Payment System] or LCHS [regional payment systems], PBC will apply a penalty interest rate to financial institutions with overdrafts, and extend an overnight credit."
A bank in overdraft will lose money from lending activities if its marginal credit margin is below the penalty rate. It would then be in the interest of the bank to reduce its loan portfolio in order not to end up short on reserves for the central bank. As the end-of-quarter deadline to deliver the reserves to the PBoC approaches, the interbank market interest rate can be expected to spike upwards if the total amount of reserves in the system is too low. More precisely, the interest rate will approach the penalty rate on overdrafts. This is just the mechanism Fullwiler (2010, 4) described:
reserves do not create loans, they are rather the required ex-post financing condition validating all granted loans. help by offering cheaper overdrafts, which is unknown. In this period, however, the RRR was lowered and the actual loan-to-deposit ratio fell from its legal ceiling of 75%
to 65% within two months in 2009 (see Figure 5 ). In addition, Figure 2 showed monetary aggregates to have fallen during that time. The loan-to-deposit ratio of 75% has been a cornerstone to China's banking system for 17 years. Figure 5 shows that it was not surpassed until 2009. Despite a recordhigh reserve ratio of 21.5% (lowered to 20% in mid-2012), the actual loan-to-deposit level has been on the rise reaching almost 90% in late 2011. Shang Fulin, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) noted that a stunning 64 commercial banks where surpassing their average daily loan-to-deposit ratio of 75% at the end of September 2011. An interesting phenomenon is that the interest rates for short-term inter-banking lending in Figure 4 feature drastic increases in the last days of a quarter. When the quarterly check is over, the interest rate decreases again.
From September 2008 onwards the two monetary policy instruments RRR and loanto-deposit ratio seem to have been ineffective, at least in the expansionary direction.
If loan demand from firms is insufficient, the ability to create more loans alone does not make banks lend out more. Despite a lowering of the reserve ratio in Q3 2008, growth of the monetary aggregates turned around only in mid-2009 when economic conditions normalized and loan demand picked up as interest rate rise in Figure 4 shows 
Policy implications
We have put two theories -the Mundell-Fleming model and the compensation thesis -to a test by examining assumptions and predictions of both regarding foreign reserves and money supply. We have found evidence pointing towards the validity of the compensation thesis while the mechanism suggested by the Mundell-Fleming Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) call 'financial repression'.
The increase in total assets and liabilities in the financial system increases the fragility in the financial structure and distorts incentives. Low real returns to capital favours credit-driven investment over consumption and, perhaps somewhat later, speculation over real investment. Whatever the channels will be, it seems that capital inflows to China do not automatically lead to a change in the money supply. The compensation thesis is correct in assuming that the central bank has some instruments at its disposal to shift the burden of adjustment into different directions.
This leaves quite a large role for monetary policy which Mundell's impossible trinity denies.
Chinese monetary policy as conducted by the PBoC can be understood from a compensation thesis point of view. The PBoC insulated inflows of foreign capital from the monetary base and focused on the loan aggregate by using the RRR in conjunction with a 75% loan-to-deposit ratio. We find no evidence that the latter is in fact a policy instrument and the legal ceiling was consequently converted into a monitoring variable in July 2012 by the Chinese banking regulator. In the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy the use of the RRRs turned out to be ineffective and was replaced by fiscal policy while the world economy was grinding to a halt. By now, monetary policy is back as the preferred instrument for economic policy control in China but an historically high loan-to-deposit ratio despite a record-high reserve ratio of over 20% leaves little room for non-loan bank activities casting clouds of doubt over the sustainability of the quantity-driven approach to Chinese monetary policy. 
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